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Abstract 
In this paper we draw on insights from theories in the management and corporate governance literature to 
develop a theoretical model that makes explicit the links between a firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
related board attributes, its board CSR strategy, and its environmental and social performance. We then test the 
model using structural equation modeling approach.  
We find that the greater the CSR orientation of the board (as measured by the board’s independence, gender 
diversity, and financial expertise on audit committee), the more proactive and comprehensive the firm’s CSR 
strategy, and the higher its environmental and social performance. Moreover, we find this link to be endogenous 
and self-reinforcing, with superior CSR performers tending to further strengthen their board CSR orientation. 
This result while positive is also suggestive of the widening of the gap between the leads and laggards in CSR. 
Therefore the question arises as to how ‘leaders’ are using their superior CSR competencies seen by many 
scholars as a source of corporate (at times unfair) competitive advantage. Stakeholders of corporations therefore 
need to be cognizant of this aspect of CSR when evaluating a firm’s CSR activities. Policy makers also need to 
be cognizant of these concerns when designing regulation in this field.  
Keywords: Board of directors, Corporate governance, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Resource-based 
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Introduction 
Research in the field of corporate environmental and social responsibility generally referred 
to as corporate social responsibility (CSR) has attracted the attention of scholars from diverse 
disciplines including management and corporate governance. Drawing from the management 
literature, particularly the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) theory, scholars have 
argued that firms possessing unique human resources like superior managerial capabilities, as 
well as superior organizational strategies such as proactive environmental strategies, are able 
to develop competitive advantages in CSR, which in turn enable such firms to achieve 
superior environmental and economic performance (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Clarkson et al. 
2011; Hart 1995; Porter and van der Linde 1995; Russo and Fouts 1997). A significant 
limitation of this literature is that while managerial capability and superior environmental 
strategies are assumed to be the main factors driving superior environmental performance, 
these variables are neither directly measured, nor explicitly incorporated in the research 
design leading to conceptually incomplete analysis (e.g. Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Clarkson et 
al. 2011; Russo and Fouts 1997). This paper conceptually and methodologically advances this 
stream of literature by explicitly measuring and incorporating in the research design variables 
that measure a firm’s board level CSR orientation and its board CSR strategy, linking these 
with the firm’s environmental and social performance. Our analysis thus helps advance the 
RBV-based CSR literature, explicitly identifying the board level human resources and 
strategies that can help firms achieve a competitive edge in the field of CSR, often seen as the 
new battleground for corporate competitive advantage (Galbreath 2010; Hart 1995; Lash and 
Wellington 2007; Porter and Reinhardt 2007). 
In recent years, scholars working in the field of corporate governance have also 
started taking a keen interest in the study of CSR. This is in line with the broadening scope of 
corporate governance (CG) which is no longer seen to be limited to aligning the interest of 
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the managers of public corporations with those of its capital providers (as per agency theory, 
Jensen and Meckling 1976), but also of the firm with those of its wider stakeholders 
(Aguilera et al. 2007; (UK) Companies Act 2006; Jensen 2002; Rodrigue et al. 2013; UK 
Code of Corporate Governance 2010). Within this literature the role of the board, which is 
the apex decision making body in a public corporation, has been the main focus of attention. 
Accordingly, scholars drawing upon the agency or the resource dependence theory (RDT, 
Boyd 1990; Hillman et al. 2000; Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Pfeffer 1972, 1973; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978) examine the link between various board attributes, including 
outside/independent director attributes and measures of corporate social performance (e.g. 
Johnson and Greening 1999; Jo and Harjoto 2011, 2012; Mallin and Michelon 2011; Post et 
al. 2011; Webb 2004). These studies argue that certain directors, particularly outside directors, 
serve on a board to provide effective managerial oversight (as per agency theory, Fama and 
Jensen 1983), as well as to play an effective resource dependence role (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978) by providing essential resources to a firm or by helping the firm secure these resources 
through linkages with its external environment (cf. Pfeffer 1973; Hillman et al. 2000). There 
are two significant limitations of this literature. First, most of it considers board director 
attributes to be exogenous (e.g. Mallin and Michelon 2011; Rodrigue et al. 2013). Second, it 
is conceptually incomplete in the sense that it does not clearly identify board 
actions/decisions that contribute to superior CSR performance. However, it is widely 
acknowledged within the corporate governance literature (e.g. Adams et al. 2010; Agrawal 
and Knoeber 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998, 2003) that board of director characteristics 
and firm performance are endogenous outcomes. Moreover it is also proposed by Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2003) that this link is mediated by board actions/decisions, which research to 
date has largely assumed away – a significant caveat in governance-performance type 
research highlighted in recent literature reviews (cf. Adams et al. 2010; Johnson et al. 2013). 
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Our study thus contributes to the corporate governance-related CSR literature both 
conceptually as well as methodologically, by developing and testing a theoretical model 
(adapted from Hermalin and Weisbach 2003) which makes explicit the potentially 
endogenous links between CSR-related director attributes, board CSR-related strategic 
decisions, and corporate environmental and social performance. In doing so, it also directly 
responds to the need for developing a better understanding of the decisions and activities that 
a board undertakes to address the growing corporate environmental and social challenges 
(Mallin et al. 2013).  
The empirical analysis based on the proposed theoretical model, suggests that firms 
with more CSR oriented boards (i.e. those with more independent directors, women directors 
as well as directors possessing financial expertise sitting on the audit committee) develop a 
more proactive and comprehensive board CSR strategy (i.e. one which combines internal 
CSR strengths with external CSR reputation building measures). Such firms in turn achieve 
superior environmental and social performance. We also find this link to be endogenous and 
self-reinforcing, with firms having superior environmental and social performance, further 
strengthening their board level CSR orientation. Overall these results are in line with the 
predictions of RDT as well as RBV theory. Our findings shed light on the board level human 
resources and strategies required to achieve superior environmental and social performance. 
They also lend support to the key RBV theory prediction (Hart 1995; Russo and Fouts 1997) 
that in order to sustain competitive advantages in the field of CSR, proactive CSR oriented 
firms tend to keep building on their CSR strengths (as the positive cyclical link suggests). 
Our paper also makes a more general contribution: the theoretical model and 
empirical approach developed in this paper can be applied to guide any future investigation of 
the link between board attributes, board decisions, and firm performance outcomes, be it in 
the field of CSR or corporate governance in general.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the relevant 
literature and develops the theoretical model with its set of interconnected testable hypotheses. 
It is followed by the discussion of the variables and structural model specifications. Next we 
discuss the sample and the data, and, subsequently, analyze the results. Finally, we present 
the conclusions, implications, and limitations of this study.  
Literature Review, Theoretical Model, and Hypothesis Development 
As scholars and policy makers widen the remit of corporate governance to include corporate 
responsibilities towards not only the shareholders but also other stakeholders of the firm (e.g. 
Jensen 2002; Rodrigue et al. 2013; (UK) Companies Act 2006; UK Corporate Governance 
Code 2010), in recent years academic research has examined the link between various 
governance mechanisms, particularly the board related characteristics and a firm’s CSR 
performance. These studies have drawn upon the agency and the resource dependence theory 
perspectives. From the agency theory perspective, the board of directors (particularly the 
outside directors on the board) is considered to be decision control experts with reputational 
concerns (Fama and Jensen 1983). Hence they have incentives to perform an effective 
monitoring task which includes protecting the interests of not just the shareholders but also 
other stakeholders of the firm (Johnson and Greening 1999). Applying such a logic, Johnson 
and Greening (1999) argue that non-executives on a board are likely to have a wider 
stakeholder perspective in strategic decision making as opposed to a narrow shareholder 
perspective often adopted by top management, concerned with meeting short term 
shareholder oriented performance targets. Consistent with these arguments, Johnson and 
Greening (1999) find a positive link between outside director representation on the board and 
measures of corporate social performance. More recently, Jo and Harjoto (2011, 2012) also 
find that effective corporate governance mechanisms including independent boards, promote 
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CSR engagement, thus helping reduce the conflicts between the firm and its wider 
stakeholders, and positively influencing firm value.  
The resource dependence theory (RDT) is the perspective recently drawn upon by 
scholars to explain the role of the board in achieving CSR objectives (e.g. Mallin and 
Michelon 2011; Mallin et al. 2013). The board is seen from the RDT perspective as a 
resource for managing a firm’s external environmental dependencies and uncertainties, such 
as those posed by the social and natural environmental challenges (Pfeffer 1972, 1973; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Hillman et al. 2000). Based on a comprehensive review of prior 
relevant research, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) outline key resource dependence related 
contributions of the board, namely: enhancing the legitimacy and public image of the firm; 
providing expertise; providing advice and counsel; linking the firm to important stakeholders 
or other important entities; facilitating access to resources; building external relations; and 
aiding in the formulation of strategy and other important firm decisions. Therefore, these 
board contributions have a direct relevance for a firm’s CSR. For instance, gaining social 
legitimacy and positive stakeholder reputation are considered vital for economic success in 
today’s natural resource-depleted, stakeholder-sensitive business climate (Hart 1995; Hillman 
and Keim 2001; Jensen 2002, Porter and Kramer 2006). To this end, a firm has to have the 
right mix of directors, particularly outside directors who can bring the diversity of knowledge, 
skills, experience, expertise, and ties (Fama and Jensen 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978); as 
well as a broader stakeholder orientation (Wang and Dewhirst 1992) that can help develop an 
effective CSR strategy leading to superior CSR performance. Consistent with such arguments, 
studies tend to find a positive association between the proportion of outside directors 
including women directors and various measures of CSR performance (Mallin and Michelon 
2011; Post et al. 2011; Webb 2004). For example, Mallin and Michelon (2011) draw upon the 
RDT and argue that, as providers of both human and relational capital, outside directors and 
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women directors can enhance a firm’s social performance and its reputation by developing 
useful relationships with the firm’s stakeholders. Such directors are also argued to provide 
insightful advice to top management about stakeholders’ expectations. Consistent with these 
arguments, Mallin and Michelon (2011) find a positive link between a number of board 
attributes including board independence and gender diversity on the board. Similar results are 
also found by Post et al. (2011) who find that firms with higher proportion of outside 
directors and those with three or more female directors tend to have higher Kinder Lydenberg 
Domini (KLD) strengths scores. Webb (2004), who investigates the differences in the 
structure of the board of directors between socially responsible and matched non-responsible 
firms, also finds that socially responsible firms tend to have larger boards, more independent 
board members, and more women on their boards. Thus, prior studies tend to find a positive 
association between various board attributes, particularly board independence and gender 
diversity, and measures of corporate social performance.  
It is important to note though that most prior studies examining the link between 
board characteristics and CSR performance tend to treat the board attributes as exogenous. 
However, it is widely acknowledged in the corporate governance literature (e.g. Adams et al. 
2010; Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998, 2003) that the composition 
of the board of directors of a company is an endogenous outcome. Discussing the perils of 
ignoring the exogenous or endogenous interpretation of most governance research, Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2003, p. 8) note that “[w]hile it is generally difficult to distinguish between 
the two interpretations in a given study, they often have drastically different implications for 
policy.” To illustrate this point Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) cite Hermalin and Weisbach’s 
(1998) finding of poor firm performance leading to increase in board independence and, note 
that “[i]n a cross-section this effect is likely to make firms with independent directors look 
worse...” It is precisely for this reason that Hambrick (2007, p. 338), notes that controlling for 
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endogeneity in research is “not a technical nicety but, instead is essential for gaining a grasp 
of the causal mechanisms that lie behind empirical associations.”  
In an effort to conceptually tease out the board attributes-firm performance link, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) present a theoretical model that makes explicit the expected 
endogenous links between board characteristics, board actions/decisions, and firm 
performance, reasoning that the characteristics-performance link is mediated by board 
actions/decisions. Their model points to another gap in the board characteristics-performance 
research: studies on board attributes-performance link assume away the board decisions that 
contribute to superior performance. This caveat has been reiterated again by recent literature 
reviews on boards by Adams et al. (2010) and Johnson et al. (2013). In this study, we adapt 
Hermalin and Weisbach’s (2003) model and make explicit the expected endogenous links 
between board attributes, board decisions/actions and firm CSR performance. Moreover the 
use of structural equation modeling (SEM) technique allows us to take into account the 
potential endogeneity of this link in our analysis (cf. Bollen 1989). 
Scholars have also approached the study of CSR performance from a management 
perspective. Studies in this stream of literature tend to draw upon the resource-based view of 
the firm (RBV) and argue that it is the firm-specific unique resources including physical 
assets and financial resources, but more importantly unique human competencies and 
organizational strategies that create sustainable competitive advantages for firms. Among the 
first to apply this theory in the context of CSR was Hart (1995) who theorizes that proactive 
investments in environmental strategies, particularly those related to pollution prevention, 
product stewardship (i.e. manufacturing and promoting ‘green’ products) and sustainable 
(corporate) development could confer both environmental and economic benefits to firms. 
His analysis suggests that to be effective, CSR has to be adopted as a comprehensive strategy 
encompassing all aspects of a firm’s operations rather than as odd bits and pieces of corporate 
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social responsibility. Moreover, Hart (1995) also notes that for a sustained competitive 
advantage, internal competitive strengths need to be complemented by external social 
legitimacy. He thus highlights the importance of communicating these proactive 
environmental strategies to external stakeholders, which could “reinforce and differentiate a 
firm’s position through the positive effects of a good reputation” (Hart 1995, p. 999). Russo 
and Fouts (1997) empirically test the predictions of RBV and find a positive link between 
environmental performance and firm operating profitability. They assume this link to be 
mediated by the unobserved superior environmental strategy, which they conjecture to be 
based on unique combinations of intangibles (such as human capital, reputation, and 
technology) and tangible assets (such as financial reserves and physical equipment). The 
RBV theory has also been applied by more recent CSR-related studies including those of Al-
Tuwaijri et al. (2004) and Clarkson et al. (2011) who attribute their finding of a positive link 
between a firm’s environmental and financial performance to the unobserved managerial 
quality and CSR strategy. Hence, while prior studies adopting RBV posit board human 
resource quality and superior environmental strategies to be responsible for superior 
environmental performance, they fail to explicitly incorporate any direct measures capturing 
CSR-conducive board human resources or CSR strategies. In this study, we conceptually and 
methodologically advance this stream of literature by explicitly modeling, measuring, and 
testing the link between board level CSR-conducive human resources, CSR strategy, and firm 
environmental and social performance. Figure 1 presents diagrammatically the omissions in 
the two streams of the extant CSR literature discussed above. It is worth noting that while 
under both theories the board would be regarded as a resource, under RBV the board would 
be regarded as a tacit (i.e. invisible), socially complex (i.e. based on team effort), and internal 
resource (Hart, 1995). Under RDT, it is considered as a visible link with the firm’s external 
environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In other words, the board’s roles in CSR under 
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RBV and RDT can be considered complementary and is consonant with Hart’s (1995, p. 998) 
key insight that ”a purely internal (competitive) approach may prove inadequate because 
issues of external (social) legitimacy and reputation are also extremely important”. Hence the 
board’s CSR orientation is likely to be driven by both the firm’s internal CSR-related needs, 
as well as its external CSR-related considerations. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
While our discussion to this point makes clear the direction and nature of the causal positive 
links we expect between board CSR orientation, CSR strategy, and firm CSR performance, it 
does not clarify how CSR performance may affect board CSR orientation. There is an 
ongoing debate in the literature about the inter-relationships between corporate governance 
(CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). While most scholars agree that these are 
inter-related (see e.g. Aguilera et al. 2007; Jamali et al. 2008; Jensen 2002), the specific 
nature of the causal relation between the two has only recently been formally investigated. 
Specifically, Jo and Harjoto (2012) find that while desirable corporate governance 
mechanisms, including (lagged) board independence, affect CSR positively, no evidence of 
lagged CSR engagement affecting current corporate governance mechanisms (including 
board independence) is found. However, they do not posit any hypothesis as to why and in 
which direction the causality (if at all) could run from superior CSR engagement to pro-CSR 
governance mechanisms. Yet, there are theoretical grounds (discussed below) to suggest that 
a positive link may run from CSR performance to board CSR orientation. 
Here we again draw upon the insights from RBV and RDT theories. Drawing on RBV 
theory, Hart (1995) maintains that for firms to sustain their competitive advantages in the 
field of environment, it is important to consistently build upon their internal human and 
organizational competencies and resources, as these may otherwise erode over time as 
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competitors catch up. Russo and Fouts (1997) also stress the importance of nurturing and 
building resources through sustained actions for creating and maintaining a pro-
environmental internal capabilities and external reputation. Consistent with these arguments, 
the composition of a board of directors is not only a unique internal resource, but also a 
source of building external linkages, reputation and social legitimacy – the view taken by the 
RDT theorists (Pfeffer 1972, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Hence, it can be argued that 
in order to build and nurture their CSR-conducive board resources as well as to build a 
positive stakeholder reputation (a valuable intangible resource and a source of corporate 
competitive advantage, Hart 1995), superior CSR performers may further strengthen their 
board level CSR orientation. Accordingly, we expect a positive link between CSR 
performance and board CSR orientation.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2 summarizes our theoretical model. Based on the preceding discussion and our 
theoretical model, we hypothesize the following inter-connected relations:  
H1: The higher a board’s CSR orientation, the more comprehensive the board level 
CSR strategy. 
H2: The more comprehensive a firm’s board level CSR strategy, the higher its 
environmental and social performance. 
H3: The higher a firm’s environmental and social performance, the higher its board- 
level CSR orientation. 
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Variables and Models 
Endogenous Variables  
Board CSR Orientation. To capture the latent construct, i.e. board’s CSR orientation, we use 
three board attributes as indicators: board independence (i.e. proportion of outside director 
representation on board), board gender diversity, and financial expertise on audit committee. 
Below we discuss the rationale for inclusion of each of these variables.  
    Board independence. From the agency theory perspective, to reduce opportunism and 
agency costs, boards should consist of a greater proportion of outside directors. With a 
greater proportion of outsiders, a board is likely to be more independent and objective in its 
decision making as well as have greater monitoring potential (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
Outside directors can monitor the behavior of managers and intervene when managers behave 
opportunistically (Post et al. 2011). For example, inside directors tend to be more attentive 
than outsiders to short-term economic performance goals, while outsiders may feel that 
attending to the environmental and social issues is in the best long-term interest of 
shareholders (Johnson and Greening 1999). From a resource dependence theory perspective, 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggest that the selection of a greater number of independent 
directors signals a firm’s intent to pay greater attention to its external environment and 
legitimacy. Furthermore, Wang and Dewhirst (1992) and Mallin and Michelon (2011) 
consider outside directors to be boundary spanners who can attract valuable resources to a 
firm as well as help a firm establish external links with stakeholders and other organizations. 
According to Galbreath (2010), board independence could help challenge existing mental 
models in board decision making, bringing in new insights and perspectives related to 
environmental and social stakeholders. Accordingly, we argue that there is a positive 
association between the board independence and its CSR orientation. Asset4 the database 
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used in this study (discussed in detail in the next section) measures board independence by 
the percentage of independent board members as reported by a company. 
    Women on board. There is a growing societal as well as regulatory pressure (see Financial 
Reporting Council 2011) that to gain social legitimacy, boards should represent the 
population they serve and thus should become more diverse and inclusive (Hillman et al. 
2002). According to the 2013 Cranfield Female FTSE Board Report, women make up 5.8% 
(5.4%) of executive and 21.8% (16.6%) of non-executive directors on FTSE 100 (FTSE 250) 
companies (Sealy and Vinnicombe 2013). In addition to enhancing social legitimacy, both 
theory and empirical evidence suggests that women may bring a number of competencies and 
stakeholder related values to a corporate board. Hillman et al. (2002) compare the educational 
and occupational background of women and racial minority directors with white American 
directors and find women directors to be more highly educated than their white male 
counterparts. Women are also more likely to be support specialists or community influential 
rather than business experts (categorizations developed by Hillman et al. 2000), due to their 
often non-conventional career paths. Singh et al. (2006) also find that women are more likely 
to possess community related expertise. Kramer et al. (2006) find that the presence of women 
on boards tends to broaden the content of boardroom discussion to include the perspectives of 
multiple stakeholders. A recent comprehensive literature review of women on corporate 
boards also draws the conclusion that most research on the role of women on boards is 
focused around their potential role in building fairer and more inclusive business institutions 
that reflect the expectations of present generation of stakeholders (Terjesen et al. 2009). 
Nielsen and Huse (2010) draw upon theories of gender differences and group effectiveness to 
examine the contribution of women on boards of directors. Their findings suggest that 
women on boards tend to accept others’ positions, support others, and contribute to solving of 
relational and interpersonal problems. Hence they conclude that ‘women may be particularly 
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sensitive to – and may exercise influence on – decisions pertaining to certain organizational 
practices, such as corporate social responsibility and environmental politics’ (Nielsen and 
Huse 2010, p. 138). The Financial Reporting Council (2011) consultation document on 
gender diversity also echoes the expectation that women on boards may help companies build 
better relationships with its key stakeholders like customers and employees. Overall, both 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the role of women on boards suggest that 
they are more likely to be sensitive to the expectations of stakeholders other than 
shareholders. Hence we expect presence of women on the board to be positively associated 
with CSR orientation. Asset4 measures board diversity as percentage of women on the board 
of directors. 
    Financial expertise on audit committee. The UK Combined Code (2003), consistent with 
the recommendations of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) in US (which is used by Asset4 for 
measuring audit committee expertise), suggests that at least some members of audit 
committees should have adequate knowledge of finance and financial matters. In UK, as in 
other countries, audit committees are responsible for monitoring the integrity of the financial 
statements of the company and for the oversight of the company’s systems of internal control 
and risk management (FRC 2010). Consistent with the expectations, research finds that 
appropriately staffed audit committees (in terms of having independent non-executives and 
especially financial experts sitting on them) perform a better oversight function and help 
enhance firm value (Chan and Li 2008). Recently, Khan et al. (2013) find the presence of an 
audit committee to have a positive impact on CSR disclosures. As environmental risks can 
have significant financial implications in the form of environmental fines as well as potential 
cash outlays for pollution control and for investments in environmentally friendly 
technologies (Freedman and Patten 2004), audit committees with members having financial 
expertise are likely to be better equipped for advising the board on developing policies and 
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strategies that can help avoid and manage these risks. In this regard, Goodstein and Boeker 
(1991) state that the specific and unique individual competencies of board directors 
contribute differently to the board process and priorities, thus motivating management to 
adopt specific strategies and actions. Hence, financial experts on audit committees can be 
regarded as what Hillman et al. (2000, p. 241) categorize as ‘support specialists’ that is 
“directors who provide expertise and linkages in specific, identifiable areas that support the 
firm’s strategies.” Members of audit committees with financial expertise can thus help a firm 
better assess its CSR-related financial and regulatory risks and help the management develop 
effective CSR related risk management and reporting strategies. For example, to improve 
CSR reporting quality financial experts on audit committees can encourage firms to comply 
with Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines in environmental and social reporting, 
integrate their financial and non-financial reporting, and encourage firms to get an external 
audit of a firm’s CSR report. Research suggests that such an audit is valued highly by 
investors (Lee and Hutchison 2005). Asset4 measures audit committee expertise as a dummy 
variable with a score 1 if a company has an audit committee with at least three members, one 
of whom is considered as a ‘financial expert’ within the meaning of Sarbanes-Oxley, and 0 
otherwise. 
Board CSR Strategy. Relatively little research has specifically identified variables that could 
capture a firm’s board level strategic stance towards its CSR-related responsibilities. A 
notable exception is the study by Galbreath (2010), who uses five dimensions developed by 
the California Environmental Resources Evaluation System (CERES) to demonstrate a firm’s 
governance practices to address climate change. Asset4 develops an index for capturing a 
firm’s board level CSR policy and strategy based on measures that are closely aligned with 
those used by Galbreath (2010). These measures are: 1) decision to establish a separate CSR 
committee; 2) decision to comply with GRI guidelines; 3) decision to have an external audit 
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of the firm’s CSR report; 4) decision to integrate the firm’s financial and extra-financial 
reporting; and 5) decision to report on the firm’s CSR-related global activities. It can argued 
that the more of these measures a firm adopts, the more proactive and comprehensive is its 
board level CSR planning, oversight, and communication strategy. First, having a separate 
CSR committee not only indicates a public recognition of the importance of environmental 
and social responsibilities for the firm at the top i.e. the ‘symbolic’ reputational role that these 
committees play (Rodrigue et al. 2013), but it can also constitute a real commitment of board 
level human resources and organizational structures, that can enable effective planning and 
oversight in this area thus contributing to better CSR performance. According to Mackenzie 
(2007), CSR committees play an important role in assisting the management in CSR strategy 
formulation and in reviewing the firm’s CSR performance. In his review of the terms of 
reference of CSR committees in UK corporations, he finds that 10 out of 11 mention their 
task as establishing CSR policies and standards. He cites Rio Tinto’s Report for 2004 as an 
example: “The purpose of the committee is to ensure that Rio Tinto management has in place 
the policies, standards, systems and people required to meet Group social and environmental 
commitments” (Mackenzie 2007, p. 939). The interviews of board members by Rodrigue et 
al. (2013) confirm this function of such committees, as the following quote of one 
interviewee from their study reveals: “the committee makes sure to tell the board: ‘Here it is, 
we conducted a diligent review,… Everything is under control, except here, except there, and 
we will follow up’” (Rodrigue et al. 2013, p. 123). Consistent with this expectation of the 
instrumental/advisory role of CSR committees in improving CSR performance, Mallin and 
Michelon (2011) find a positive link between the presence of such board committees and 
measures of corporate social performance.  
Second, the decision of companies to adhere to GRI guidelines can be interpreted as a 
commitment on the part of firms to improve their CSR performance as well as the 
17 
 
measurement of this performance. This expectation is in line with the finding of Larsen (2007) 
who reports that the introduction of the legislation that mandated Danish companies to 
publish ‘green accounts’ led to companies actually improving their environmental 
management systems (in term of environmental impact reduction and efficiency). Citing the 
case of one Danish company that considered its environmental reporting as a strategic 
decision, Larsen (2007, p. 284) notes that “the company wanted easier access to 
environmental information because of a strategic decision of improving their internal 
environmental efficiency, and because they expect easier access to valid information to be of 
great importance to their future competitiveness.” Hence, committing to GRI guidelines can 
enable a firm to systematic and consistent production and reporting of its environmental 
performance data. This in turn can allow the firm and its stakeholders to track the 
development of the firm’s CSR performance over time, thus helping enhance its 
competitiveness as well as stakeholder accountability. In this last regard, Clarkson et al. 
(2008) note the importance of compliance with GRI guidelines in reporting, if firms are to 
gain credibility among their various stakeholders.  
 Third, the decision to have the CSR report externally audited demonstrates a further 
commitment on the part of the firm to building trust with its stakeholders. Lee and Hutchison 
(2005) suggest that for gaining credibility investors demand CSR disclosures of firms to be 
externally audited. Fourth, the decision to integrate financial and extra financial reporting can 
be seen as an effort by the firm to increase its accountability on the social and environmental 
impacts of its operations (Eccles and Krzus 2010). Finally, a voluntary decision to report on 
their global CSR activities suggests commitment on the part of firms to enhance the 
transparency and disclosure of its global CSR related performance, thus promoting 
stakeholder engagement and helping build trust with its stakeholders. The importance of 
reporting CSR responsibility in a global context is well highlighted by this quote of an 
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interviewee from the study of Rodigue et al. (2013):  “it has become clear from the globalization, 
it’s a very small world, it’s very easy for people to get objections mobilized [...]. And so that can 
impair a company’s ability to operate, it can affect your reputation, so a small problem in one part of 
the world can become a big problem in another part of the world” (Rodrigue et al. 2013, p. 121).  
 We thus use the Asset4 vision and strategy score to capture a firm’s CSR strategy. 
According to Asset4, the aggregated vision and strategy score “measures a company’s 
commitment and effectiveness towards the creation of an overarching vision and strategy integrating 
financial and extra-financial aspects. It reflects a company’s capacity to convincingly show and 
communicate that it integrates the economic (financial), social and environmental dimensions into its 
day-to-day decision-making processes.” It is thus reasonable to argue that the more of these 
strategy and policy measures that a firm adopts that is the higher its vision and strategy score, 
the more proactive and comprehensive (in terms of internal competencies and external 
reputation building measures) is its board-level CSR strategy. Further, the more 
comprehensive and proactive a firm’s board CSR strategy is, the better its CSR performance 
is likely to be. 
Environmental and Social Performance Scores. The environmental score as defined by 
Asset4 “measures a company's impact on living and non-living natural systems, including the air, 
land and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses best 
management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities”. It 
covers ’hard’ performance indicators (as classified by Clarkson et al. 2008) such as 
information on energy used, CO2 emissions, water and waste recycled, and spills and 
pollution controversies. Hence, the aggregate environmental score can be considered to 
provide a largely objective measure of a firm’s overall environmental performance. The 
social score as defined by Asset4 “measures a company's capacity to generate trust and 
loyalty with its workforce, customers and society, through its use of best management 
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practices”. It covers issues like employee turnover, accidents, training hours, donations, and 
health and safety controversies. Social score also covers mostly ‘hard’ performance indicators 
(as defined by Clarkson et al. 2008) thus providing a largely objective measure of a firm’s 
social performance.  
The Model 
Employing the structural equation modelling (SEM) procedure, we simultaneously test the 
three interconnected hypotheses, as per Figure 2, via the following system of three equations:  
CSR strategyit = f (Board CSR orientationit, Slackit, Firm sizeit) (1) 
Environmental or social performanceit = f (CSR strategyit, Firm sizeit, 
Profitabilityit, Capital expenditureit, Block shareholdingsit,) 
(2) 
Board CSR orientationit = f (Environmental or social performanceit, Firm sizeit, 
Block shareholdingsit, Board dualityit) 
(3) 
The structural equation modelling (SEM) procedure incorporated in Stata13 allows us to both 
employ latent (unobserved) constructs and estimate the effects of a number of dependent 
variables simultaneously affecting each other. Due to its ability to take into account at the 
same time both the simultaneity and the measurement issues (Bollen 1989), we argue that, the 
SEM approach is more adequate in the context of our study, compared with other techniques 
which could be used to tackle the problem of endogeneity (e.g. instrumental variable 
approach, cf. Cheng et al. 2014). 
We follow the related extant literature (e.g. Mallin et al. 2013) and employ root mean 
squared error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), and normed fit index 
(NFI) as the criteria for assessing the goodness of fit of our models. RMSEA tells how well 
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the model with unknown but optimally chosen parameter estimates would fit the population’s 
covariance matrix (Byrne 1998). CFI and NFI compare the model with the ‘worst case 
scenario’ of a null model with all the variables being uncorrelated (Bentler 1990). The 
aforementioned measures have been argued to be both reliable and informative in empirical 
research (Mallin et al. 2013). While analyzing the goodness of fit measures, we use the cutoff 
values recommended by prior studies and deem the fit of a model to be acceptable if both CFI 
and NFI index values exceed 90% and RMSEA is smaller than .07 (Mallin et al. 2013; 
Steiger 2007).  
Exogenous Regressors and Control Variables  
Control variables used in each of the above equation are based largely on prior related 
empirical evidence. In Equation (1), CSR strategy is likely to be affected not just by board 
CSR orientation, but also the availability of financial slack and firm size. Clarkson et al. 
(2011) argue and find empirical support for the claim that firms pursuing a proactive 
environmental strategy are the ones with greater financial resources. Similar results on the 
role of financial slack in enabling pursuit of CSR oriented goals is found by Arora and 
Dharwadkar (2011) and Harrison and Coombs (2012). Hence, we expect a positive relation 
between CSR strategy and financial slack. Scholars have argued that larger firms face greater 
stakeholder responsibility pressures (Brammer and Pavelin 2006; 2008; Cho and Patten 2007; 
Mallin and Michelon 2011, Mallin et al. 2013) as well as higher litigation risks (Clarkson et 
al. 2011). Accordingly we expect CSR strategy to be positively related to firm size.  
In Equation (2), where we model environmental and social performance, we follow 
prior evidence and control for firm size, profitability, and block shareholdings. Consistent 
with prior arguments and empirical evidence (Clarkson et al. 2011; Ioannou and Serafeim 
2012; Johnson and Greening 1999; Mallin and Michelon 2011; Mallin et al. 2013), we expect 
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a positive association of firm size and profitability with both measures of CSR performance. 
There is a theoretical argument (Johnson and Greening 1999) that large block holders, due to 
their narrow short term share performance targets and illiquidity of holdings, may tend to 
focus on short term returns, whereas investments in CSR require longer time horizons. 
Recent empirical evidence supports this argument (Ioannou and Serafeim 2012). Accordingly 
we expect a negative relation between block holdings (measured as block holdings of 5% or 
more) and measures of environmental and social performance. Clarkson et al. (2011) argue 
that firms making higher capital expenditures are likely to have newer, more resource 
efficient equipment. Accordingly we account for capital expenditures in determining 
environmental and social performance.  
In Equation (3), in addition to environmental and social performance, we expect board 
CSR orientation to be positively related to firm size. As argued earlier, larger firms face 
greater public scrutiny as well as stakeholder responsibility pressures. Thus, they are more 
likely to have board members with CSR orientation. Moreover as argued earlier, block equity 
holders are more likely to be shareholder centric, thus less inclined to appoint board members 
with CSR orientation. Finally CEOs holding a chair position (i.e. duality), are likely to favor 
a CEO friendly board, thus less likely to favor outsiders on the board. There is evidence 
which suggests that powerful CEOs (such as those holding CEO and chairman position in our 
case) tend to select less independent members on the board (Shivdasani and Yermack 1999). 
Accordingly we expect a negative relation between duality and board CSR orientation.  
In terms of measurement of control variables, firm size is measured by natural 
logarithm of net sales (Mallin and Michelon 2011). Following Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) 
we employ a slack measure defined as the ratio of the sum of cash and short-term investments 
and total receivables to the book value of total assets. Profitability is measured by return on 
equity (ROE), following Mallin and Michelon (2011) and Mallin et al. (2013). Capital 
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expenditure is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures to net sales (Mallin and Michelon 
2011). Block shareholdings are measured as holdings of 5% or more (Agarwal and Knoeber 
1996). Duality is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO simultaneously chairs the board 
and 0 otherwise. 
Sample and Data 
The sample is the intersection of the Asset4 and Datastream universe of UK listed companies, 
covering the period 2002-2010. Asset4 is the database used for obtaining environmental, 
social and governance data, while Datastream is the source for all financial data. The 
intersection of these data sets yields a usable sample of 2028 firm-year observations. This is 
mainly due to the limited coverage by Asset4. Industries are classified by using the FTSE/DJ 
single-digit Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) March 2008 version. This leads to 10 
industry groups in the sample: oil and gas, basic materials, industrials, consumer goods, 
health care, consumer services, telecommunications, utilities, financials and technology. 
Table 1 gives the break-up of industries covered in the sample for each year. Table 1 shows 
that general industrials, consumer services and financials account for the bulk of companies 
in the sample. The industrials classification includes mostly heavy manufacturing industries 
like construction and building materials, defense and aerospace, and other industrial 
engineering industries like electrical components and equipment, and electronic equipment. 
Consumer services include food and drug retailers, general retailers, media, and travel and 
leisure industries. Financials include banks, insurances, real estate and financial services. In 
short, the sample represents a wide range of industries.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
23 
 
The Asset4 dataset with environmental, social, and governance scores is used in this study. 
Asset4, a Thomson Reuters business, provides largely objective, relevant and systematic 
environmental (E), social (S) and governance (G) information primarily for use by 
professional investors and corporate executives. ESG scores are based on 900 individual data 
points used as inputs to calculate 250 key performance indicators, further organized into 15 
categories within the three E, S, and G pillars: environmental (3 categories: emissions 
reduction, resource reduction, and product innovation), social (7 categories: employment 
quality, health and safety, training and development, diversity, human rights, community and 
product responsibility), and governance (5 categories: board structure, board function, 
compensation policy, shareholder rights, and vision and strategy). The key performance 
indicators, categories, and pillars from Asset4 are equally weighted calculations of relative 
company performance, the benchmark being the Asset4 company universe. These ratings are 
Z-scored, thus benchmarking the performance of each firm with the rest of the firms in the 
universe. The primary data used has to be publicly available and typical sources include stock 
exchange filings, CSR and annual reports, non-governmental organization websites and 
various news sources. In this study we use the aggregate environmental and social scores 
incorporating all categories and key performance indicators. However, given the focus of this 
study, we use only the relevant governance performance indicators, namely those related to 
board structure and board vision and strategy.  
A number of recent studies have adopted Asset4 ESG dataset to measure firms’ 
environmental, social and governance performance (e.g. Cheng et al. 2014; Ioannou and 
Serafeim 2012; Kocmnova et al. 2011). In comparison with the KLD database for US 
companies widely used in the CSR literature, Asset4 provides more comprehensive 
calculation of the rating scores. Humphrey et al. (2012) mention several issues with KLD’s 
binary rating system which involves examining a firm’s corporate social performance (CSP) 
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strengths and concerns: a firm is given a score of 0 or 1 across each strength or concern. They 
cite the case of hazardous waste production as an example. First, the binary ratings do not 
distinguish between the levels of hazardous waste production. Second, firms in heavy 
polluting industries like oil and gas have lower KLD score than other firms that have very 
limited or no disclosure to producing hazardous waste, regardless of how well the firm 
manages its hazardous waste. By definition then, the KLD ratings system is biased toward a 
higher concern score for those industries that disclose information about their environmental 
concerns. Thus, Humphrey et al. (2012) point out that the number of measures within each of 
KLD’s dimensions can skew overall CSP scores.  
Empirical Analysis and Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables used in our analyses. The mean 
values of environmental and social performance scores are 59% and 63%, respectively. 
About 52% of the board members of an average firm are independent, while about 4% of the 
firms have the same person as CEO and Chairman (i.e. duality). On average about 8% of 
board members are women. 65% of audit committees have relevant expertise (i.e. with at 
least one member being considered a ’financial expert’ within the meaning of Sarbanes-
Oxley given his or her extensive experience in accounting and auditing matters). The mean 
value of CSR strategy score is 62%. The average firm size measured as natural logarithm of 
net sales is 14.05, which is equivalent to sales value of approximately GBP 1.3 billion. The 
mean values of profitability, capital expenditure and block shareholdings are 25%, 15%, and 
26%, respectively. The average slack resources available in a firm correspond to 12% of the 
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book value of total assets. Table 3 displays the pairwise correlations for all variables. Given 
the relatively moderate levels of correlations among most variables, multi-collinearity is not 
likely to be a problem for our analyses. 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
SEM Results 
Table 4 reports the results of structural equation modelling with respect to environmental 
performance. All three indicators fall within the desirable ranges (RMSEA = .068, CFI = .919, 
NFI = .912) indicating acceptable goodness of fit for the corresponding model. Importantly, 
Table 4 supports all of our three hypotheses. Specifically, we find that boards which are more 
CSR oriented tend to show greater commitment to CSR by developing a more proactive and 
comprehensive board CSR strategy, which in turn allows them to achieve superior 
environmental performance. Moreover, superior environmental performers also tend to 
choose more CSR-conducive board attributes. Hence, our findings suggest the existence of a 
cyclical link among a firm’s board CSR orientation, board CSR strategy, and its 
environmental performance. The aforementioned relationships are not only statistically 
significant, but also economically meaningful. In particular, one standard deviation increase 
in board CSR orientation leads to an increase of CSR strategy by about 22% of the respective 
standard deviation (β = .216, p < .001). One standard deviation increase in CSR strategy 
boosts environmental performance by almost 54% of the respective standard deviation (β 
= .539, p < .001). Finally, one standard deviation increase in environmental performance 
enhances board CSR orientation to somewhat smaller extent, i.e. by 15% of the respective 
standard deviation (β = .152, p < .001). The results of Table 4 also show that, in our 
measurement model, loadings corresponding to all three indicators for board CSR orientation, 
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namely board independence (β = .552, p < .001), gender diversity (β = .369, p < .001), and 
audit committee expertise (β = .442, p < .001) are highly significant and have correct signs.  
The results with respect to control variables in Table 4 are as expected. Consistent 
with prior literature (e.g. Clarkson et al. 2011; Ioannou and Serafeim 2012), firm size is 
positively linked with CSR strategy (β = .382, p < .001), environmental performance (β 
= .251, p < .001), and board CSR orientation (β = .278, p < .001). This indicates that since 
larger, more visible firms tend to face greater pressure from a variety of external stakeholders 
(Deegan 2002; Patten 2002), they have incentives to improve their environmental 
performance as well as to strengthen their board CSR orientation. Consistent with prior 
related literature (Ioannou and Serafeim 2012) we find block shareholdings to be negatively 
related to environmental performance (β = -.094, p < .001) and board CSR orientation (β = -
.462, p < .001), suggesting that large shareholders in a firm tend to be more interested in 
shareholder, and less interested in other stakeholder interests. Contrary to our expectations 
but consistent with the findings of Mallin and Michelon (2011), we find no link between firm 
profitability (i.e. ROE) and environmental performance. Capital expenditure consistent with 
previous findings (Clarkson et al. 2011) is positively linked with environmental performance 
(β = .047, p < .01), suggesting that in general firms are now investing in environmentally 
friendly technologies. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 reports the results of structural equation modelling with respect to social performance. 
The corresponding model fit is again satisfactory (RMSEA = .068, CFI = .919, NFI = .912) 
and, overall, the results are very similar to those in Table 4, corroborating our hypotheses for 
social performance as well. In terms of control variables, a notable difference between Tables 
4 and 5 is that the coefficient on capital expenditure is not significant in Table 5, indicating 
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that capital expenditure does not affect a firm’s social performance. This is not entirely 
surprising, given that better social performance is likely to be less financial capital sensitive, 
but more human relational capital sensitive.  
Sensitivity Analyses 
To test the robustness of the above results, we run a number of sensitivity tests. In the interest 
of brevity, below we just summarize key findings without reporting the corresponding model 
estimates in the paper.  
First, in panel data set like ours it is possible that observations corresponding to the 
same firms over years may not be independent. In order to account for such a possibility, we 
cluster standard errors at firm level and re-estimate models reported in Tables 4 and 5. While 
the clustering procedure precludes the computation of the model fit measures, it allows us to 
corroborate the conclusions by examining the adjusted standard errors of the estimates and 
resulting significance levels. In short, while z-statistics for many of the coefficients are lower 
in the case of the models involving clustering of standard errors, all the coefficients 
significant in the base model specifications retain their significance in models involving 
clustering. Importantly, all three coefficients corresponding to the hypothesized effects of the 
three endogenous variables remain significant at 1.5% or better in the models including either 
environmental or social performance, further corroborating Hypotheses 1-3.  
Second, prior studies indicate that environmental responsibility is influenced by the 
nature of business activities, particularly by industry sectors most closely associated with 
environmental concerns (Brammer and Pavelin 2008). We thus amend our model 
specifications and include industry fixed effects in the equations explaining environmental or 
social performance. While the goodness of fit for the resulting models is somewhat weaker 
than for those reported in Tables 4 and 5, the relationships stipulated by our hypotheses 
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remain highly significant. Importantly, while we do find evidence of differences in CSR 
performance across industries, there is also variation in significance of the industry fixed 
effects between models including environmental and social performance. This finding is in 
line with Cormier et al.’s (2011) suggestion that it is important to distinguish environmental 
performance from social performance in CSR related studies.  
 Finally, we examine the effect of inclusion of year fixed effects. Again, while the fit 
indices for the resulting models are somewhat weaker than before, the relationships stipulated 
by our hypotheses remain highly significant.  
At this point it is worth noting one limitation of our sample. As the main clientele of 
Asset4 are investors, particularly large investors, our analysis reveals that firms covered by 
Asset4 differ systematically from those in the universe of FTSE all share companies. 
Specifically we find that companies covered by Asset4 tend to be larger, have more slack 
resources and higher capital expenditures. Moreover, the database coverage tends to improve 
towards the final years of the sample. However, we find no evidence of industry bias in our 
sample. These database limitations may somewhat limit the generalizability of our results. 
Conclusions and Implications  
Conclusions 
In this study drawing upon the theoretical insights from the management and corporate 
governance related CSR literature, specifically the RBV and the RDT theories, we develop 
and test a theoretical model that makes explicit the proposed endogenous links between board 
CSR orientation, board CSR strategy, and corporate environmental and social performance. 
The empirical analysis based on the proposed theoretical model, suggests that firms with 
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more CSR oriented boards (i.e. those with more independent directors, women directors as 
well as directors possessing financial expertise sitting on the audit committee) are more likely 
to develop a proactive and comprehensive board CSR strategy (i.e. one which combines 
internal organizational competencies with external reputation building measures). Such firms 
in turn are more likely to achieve superior environmental and social performance. Moreover, 
we find this link to be endogenous and self-reinforcing, with firms having superior 
environmental and social performance, further strengthening their board level CSR 
orientation.  
These findings lend support to both RBV as well as RDT theory based predictions on 
the linkages between boards, their strategies and their desired performance outcomes. 
According to the CSR-related RBV theory (Hart 1995), a board and its composition could be 
seen as a unique, internal, tacit and socially complex competitive resource which can help a 
firm develop, implement and communicate CSR strategies that promote superior 
environmental and social performance. While prior studies drawing on RBV theory, have 
highlighted the role of the top decision makers and their strategies in achieving superior 
environmental performance (e.g. Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Clarkson et al. 2011), ours to the 
best of our knowledge is the first that makes explicit the desired board attributes and the 
effective board level CSR strategies. Moreover, our finding of a cyclical link lends support to 
the key RBV theory prediction that in order to sustain competitive advantages in the field of 
CSR, proactive CSR oriented firms tend to keep building on their unique internal CSR 
competencies and resources (Hart 1995).  
Studies in the CSR literature that draw on the RDT theory, tend to assume the link to 
run from board CSR attributes to firm CSR performance, thus treating board attributes as 
exogenous (e.g. Mallin and Michelon 2011). Such treatment can lead to misleading 
interpretations. On theoretical as well as empirical level, RDT scholars (Pfeffer 1973; 
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Hillman et al. 2000) see the board composition as a response to the external challenges that a 
firm may face. Hence, the RDT theory predicts that both the board’s CSR-conducive 
composition and the firm CSR performance should be simultaneously determined by these 
social and natural environmental challenges. As our theoretical model and empirical findings 
suggest, ignoring these theoretical and empirical insights could have misleading research and 
policy implications.  
Implications  
The findings of this paper would be of interest to a number of constituencies. For 
corporate managers, our findings reinforce earlier suggestions in the literature that CSR may 
not be a viable strategy for all firms (Clarkson et al. 2011). The results shed light on the 
combination of human (at board level) and organizational (e.g. presence of a formal CSR 
committee) resources, which can help firms achieve superior CSR performance. Our findings 
also suggest that it is the larger firms that are best positioned to allocate and sustain these 
resource commitments.  
For research scholars, the theoretical model and empirical approach developed in this 
paper can be applied to guide any future investigation of the board characteristics-conduct-
performance type analysis be it in the field of CSR or corporate governance in general. 
Recent reviews of the literature on corporate boards by Adams et al. (2010) and Johnson et al. 
(2013) re-emphasize the importance of addressing the endogeneity concern as well as the 
need to move beyond attributes-performance type analysis and incorporate explicitly the 
mechanisms through which director attributes may affect firm performance outcomes. Our 
analytical approach provide among the first steps in this direction. Future research could 
build upon it by considering additional board characteristics and decisions as well as studying 
various aspects of company performance in addition to CSR outcomes. Moreover, while the 
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setup proposed here addresses the issue of simultaneity, the proposed model is static in nature. 
Development and testing of a dynamic model incorporating intertemporal relationships 
between board attributes, board actions, and corporate performance would be an interesting 
yet challenging avenue for future research. 
For policy makers, our findings of a positive cyclical link between board CSR 
attributes, CSR strategies, and CSR performance are particularly relevant as these raise 
concerns about how firms are using their strategic competitive advantages (particularly in the 
field of environmental responsibility). This cyclical link is indicative of a widening gap 
between the leaders and laggards in CSR. The business case for CSR (empirical support for 
which is now relatively abundant in the literature, see van Beurden and Gossling’s 2008 
review) rests on the premise that firms can ‘do well by doing good’. There are two issues to 
consider in this respect: First ‘doing well’ i.e. making economic profits through CSR 
activities often entail that firms should turn the CSR ‘threats’ they face, into business 
opportunities that allow for extracting economic rents. This is particularly true for 
environmental threats where the concern about looming regulation has prompted particularly 
the larger corporations to take pre-emptive measures in the environmental arena to gain 
competitive advantages vis-à-vis their smaller competitors, thus squeezing out competition. 
To illustrate this point, Devinney (2009, p. 50) cites the example where “one small mining 
company accused its global competitor of using its ‘award winning CSR positioning’ to disadvantage 
competitors by lobbying for standards that reduced the value of the small mining companies (which 
did not have the scale to absorb the costs of the new standards) so that it could purchase them at a 
discount.” This leads us to the second issue: is this really ‘doing good’ and if so, for whom? 
Corporations have multiple stakeholders and multiple responsibilities that may often involve 
trade-offs. Hence policy makers when designing regulation, need to be cognizant of how 
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social and environmental regulation may affect different corporate stakeholders and how 
firms may use their competitive advantages in the field of CSR.  
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TABLE 1 
Number of Sample Companies in Each Sector and Each Year 
Industry 
Code 
Industry 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 Total Percent 
0001 Oil & gas 4 4 12 13 13 14 14 18 19 111 5.47 
1000 Basic materials 2 2 14 14 15 18 22 22 22 131 6.46 
2000 Industrials 18 18 53 65 66 67 67 71 67 492 24.26 
3000 Consumer goods 9 9 17 22 23 23 23 27 26 179 8.83 
4000 Health care 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 9 9 48 2.37 
5000 Consumer services 21 22 46 54 57 59 59 64 62 444 21.89 
6000 Telecommunications 2 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 6 38 1.87 
7000 Utilities 6 6 7 8 8 8 8 8 7 66 3.25 
8000 Financials 18 19 49 54 54 60 60 63 60 437 21.55 
9000 Technology 2 2 6 10 10 10 10 16 16 82 4.04 
Total  85 87 211 250 256 269 273 303 294 2028 100.00 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Environmental performance 59.21 27.46 9.54 97.17 
Social performance 63.40 25.97 4.18 98.82 
Board independence 51.54 14.23 0 100 
Board diversity 7.57 9.04 0 62.5 
Audit committee expertise 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Board duality 0.04 0.19 0 1 
CSR strategy 62.03 29.64 9.51 98.61 
Firm size 14.05 1.67 7.45 19.33 
Profitability (ROE) 0.25 1.58 -9.04 58.80 
Capital expenditure 0.15 0.52 0 15.56 
Block shareholdings 0.26 0.21 0 0.91 
Slack 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.87 
Note: All variables are as defined in the “Variables and Models” section.
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TABLE 3 
Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 
Note: All variables are as defined in the “Variables and Models” section. 
† p .10  
* p .05  
** p .01  
*** p .001.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1 Environmental performance 1.00            
2 Social performance 0.72*** 1.00           
3 Board independence 0.27*** 0.32*** 1.00          
4 Board diversity 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.18*** 1.00         
5 Audit committee expertise 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.14*** 1.00        
6 Board duality -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.13*** 0.02 -0.01 1.00       
7 CSR strategy 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.14*** -0.12*** 1.00      
8 Firm size 0.51*** 0.56*** 0.31*** 0.22*** 0.10*** -0.08*** 0.48*** 1.00     
9 Profitability -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.05* -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00    
10 Capital expenditure -0.01 -0.09*** 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.28*** -0.02 1.00   
11 Block shareholdings -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.18*** -0.32*** 0.11*** -0.18*** -0.20*** 0.00 0.02 1.00  
12 Slack -0.20*** -0.12*** 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.10*** -0.20*** 0.04† -0.04† 0.12*** 1.00 
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TABLE 4 
Results of Structural Equation Model with Environmental Performance 
Structural model: 
Independent variable 
Predicted 
sign 
Dependent variable 
CSR strategy 
Environmental 
performance 
Board CSR 
orientation 
Board CSR orientation 
(H1) 
+ 
0.216 
(6.42)*** 
  
CSR strategy (H2) +  
0.539 
(31.45)*** 
 
Environmental 
performance (H3) 
+/-   
0.152 
(3.60)*** 
Firm size  + 
0.382 
(15.38)*** 
0.251 
(13.31)*** 
0.278 
(7.07)*** 
Slack + 
0.002 
(0.08) 
  
Profitability +  
-0.019 
(-1.23) 
 
Capital expenditure +  
0.047 
(2.88)** 
 
Block shareholdings -  
-0.094 
(-5.96)*** 
-0.462 
(-14.20)*** 
Board duality -   
-0.033 
(-1.05) 
Intercept 
 -1.571 
(-9.33)*** 
-0.965 
(-6.60)*** 
 
Measurement model: 
Latent construct 
Predicted 
sign 
Indicators 
Board 
independence 
Board diversity 
Audit committee 
expertise 
Board CSR orientation + 
0.552 
(17.26)*** 
0.369 
(13.86)*** 
0.442 
(15.53)*** 
Intercept  
2.439 
(11.96)*** 
0.066 
(0.49) 
0.441 
(3.27)** 
Model summary: 
Observations 2028 
Overall R-squared 0.549 
Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.068 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.919 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.912 
Note: Standardized coefficients are reported. Z-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are as defined in the 
“Variables and Models” section. 
† p .10  
* p .05  
** p .01  
*** p .001. 
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 TABLE 5 
Results of Structural Equation Model with Social Performance 
Structural model: 
Independent variable 
Predicted 
sign 
Dependent variable 
CSR strategy 
Social 
performance 
Board CSR 
orientation 
Board CSR orientation 
(H1) 
+ 
0.200 
(5.90)*** 
  
CSR strategy (H2) +  
0.494 
(28.29)*** 
 
Social performance (H3) +/-   
0.215 
(4.90)*** 
Firm size  + 
0.388 
(15.63)*** 
0.294 
(15.77)*** 
0.245 
(6.14)*** 
Slack + 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
  
Profitability +  
-0.014 
(-0.88) 
 
Capital expenditure +  
-0.024 
(-1.49) 
 
Block shareholdings -  
-0.090 
(-5.75)*** 
-0.454 
(-13.81) 
Board duality -   
-0.029 
(-0.93) 
Intercept 
 -1.569 
(-9.25)*** 
-0.952 
(-6.57)*** 
 
Measurement model: 
Latent construct 
Predicted 
sign 
Indicators 
Board 
independence 
Board diversity 
Audit committee 
expertise 
Board CSR orientation + 
0.554 
(17.54)*** 
0.376 
(14.32)*** 
0.429 
(15.02)*** 
Intercept  
2.477 
(12.37)*** 
0.077 
(0.58) 
0.499 
(3.79)*** 
Model summary: 
Observations 2028 
Overall R-squared 0.567 
Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.065 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.928 
Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.920 
Note: Standardized coefficients are reported. Z-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are as defined in the 
“Variables and Models” section. 
† p .10  
* p .05  
** p .01  
*** p .001. 
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FIGURE 1  
Existing Literature (Two Streams) 
 
 
 
 
Stream 1: Resource dependence theory (RDT) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stream 2: Resource-based view of the firm (RBV) 
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FIGURE 2  
Theoretical Model  
Measurement model: 
 
 
 
 
Structural model (core model excluding exogenous variables used in the system): 
 
 
 
 
   
Adapted from Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)
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Abbreviations 
CEO   Chief executive officer 
CERES  California Environmental Resources Evaluation System 
CFI   Comparative fit index 
CG   Corporate governance 
CSP   Corporate social performance 
CSR   Corporate social responsibility 
DJ   Dow Jones 
ESG   Environmental, social and governance 
FRC   Financial Reporting Council 
FTSE   Financial Times Stock Exchange Group 
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